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STORY'S COMMENTARIES 
STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS-ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER 
IS 
JN r834 Story published the first edition of his Commentaries 
on the Conflict of Laws.1 With the publication of this work, it 
is now generally admitted/ a new era began in the treatment of 
the subject. Italian, French, Belgian, Dutch, and German writers, 
among whom are to be found the greatest jurists of their time, 
had preceded Story in dealing with these questions. Bartolus, 
Dumoulin, D'Argentre, Rodenburg, John and Paul Voet, Huber, 
Froland, Boullenois, Bouhier, Cocceji, and Hert are a few of the 
names.3 The writers lived in different ages and under different 
social and political conditions. Questions of the conflict of laws 
attracted the attention of the Italian jurists as early as the twelfth 
century. In northern Italy independent bodies of customary law 
had developed, especially in the municipalities, which prevailed 
over the more general law. In the absence of a particular pro-
vision of local law the common law, namely, Roman law, pre-
vailed. The problems of the conflict of laws arose chiefly between 
the inhabitants of these municipalities. At first the law of the 
forum 4 was applied to these disputes, but in the course of time 
more modern doctrines were developed. According to Magister 
1 Joseph Story was born in Marblehead, Massachusetts, September IS, I779· 
He was graduated from Harvard College in I798 and was admitted to the bar in 
I8oi. In I8II, while Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, he 
was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In I829 Story was 
elected Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University, which position he held, to-
gether with that of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, until his death, Sep-
tember Io, I845· 
Story was the author of many books. In his earlier years he compiled a work on 
PLEADING (I8o5); and edited CmTTY on BILLS AND NoTES (I809), ABBOTT on 
SHIPPING (I8Io), and LAWES on PLEADING m AssuMPsiT (I8II). As Dane Profes-
sor of Law he published works on BAILMENTS (I832), the CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (I833), CoNFLICT OF LAws (I834), EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE (I836), 
EQUITY PLEADING (I838), AGENCY (I839), PARTNERSHIP (I84I), BILLS OF Ex-
CHANGE (I843), and PROMISSORY NOTES (1845). 
2 HARRisoN, ON JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CoNFLICT oF LAws (I9I9) II9 (pub-
lished originally in the Fortnightly Review in I878 and 1879); GuTZWILLER, DER 
EINFLUSS SAVIGNY'S (1923) III. 
3 I LAINE, INTERODUCTION AU DROIT INTER.."'l'ATIONAL PRIVf (I888), II (I892). 
4 See 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECBTLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES lNTERNA-
TIONALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECRTS BIS BARTOLUS (I9I6) I et seq. 
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Aldricus, whom Professor Neumeyer regards as the founder of 
the science of private international law, the questions of the con-
flict of laws should be decided with reference to the law which 
is" the more powerful and useful ".5 Apparently the judge is to 
decide the case with reference to the law which shall bring about 
justice. The development of the conflict of laws reached its height 
in Italy in the fourteenth century through the genius of the great-
est of all jurists of the middle ages- Bartol us of Sassoferrato 
(I3I4-I357)·6 
In France, however, difficulties in the conflict of laws arose be-
tween the inhabitants of the different provinces of a politically 
united kingdom. These questions seem to have come for decision 
before the Parliament of Paris and the Exchequer of Normandy 
as early as the thirteenth century.7 In the sixteenth century the 
subject of the conflict of laws was given a profound stimulus in 
France by the opposing views of Dumoulin (rsoo-rs66) and 
D'Argentre (r5r9-I590). Dumoulin placed the emphasis upon 
the "personal" statute (lex domicilii) whereas D'Argentre, in-
fluenced by the feudal notions prevailing in his native Brittany, 
urged the claims of the " territorial " law (lex rei sitae). Froland, 
Boullenois, and Bouhier developed D'Argentre's doctrine in the 
eighteenth century.8 
The questions of the conflict of laws presented themselves under 
a still different aspect to the Dutch writers of the seventeenth 
century-Paul Voet (r6r9-r677), John Voet (r647-r7I4), and 
IDricus Huber (r636-r694).9 In Italy they had been inter-
municipal; in France, interprovincial; and in Holland they were 
looked upon for the first time as international. The Dutch prov-
inces had just gained their independence. An extreme jealousy of 
their local rights existed between them. This fact, coupled with 
the growing commerce with foreign nations, caused them to regard 
the questions of the conflict of laws as arising between independ-
s 2 NEUMEYER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 67. 
6 BARTOLUS, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Beale's trans. 1914). 
7 See MEIJERS, BIJ,DRAGE TOT DE GESCHlliDENIS VAN HET INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAAT-
EN STRAFRECHT IN FRANKRIJK EN DE NEDERLANDEN (1914); Nieuwe Bijdrage tot 
het ontstaan van het beginsel der Realiteit (1922) 3 TirnsCHRIFT vooR RECH:rs-
GESCHmDENIS 6x. 8 I LAINE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 422. 
9 See Lorenzen, Huber's De Confiictu Legum in WIGMORE'S CELEBRATION LEGAL 
EssAYS (xgxg) xgg. 
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ent sovereignties. This led to the announcement of the doctrine 
of the " territoriality " of law in a more absolute sense than that 
proposed by D' Argentre. 
The most important authors belonging to the early German 
school of the conflict of laws are Cocceji (r644-r7r9) and Hert 
(r652-r7ro), Cocceji being the first German who attempted to 
establish a general theory of the conflict of laws. 
The continental writers referred to, living as they did in dif-
ferent ages, in different countries, and under different conditions, 
naturally reflected the ideas of their times. The Italian writers 
employed the scholastic method of their day. D' Argentre re-
flected the feudal notions of his native land. The Dutch writers 
were under the influence of their great compatriot Grotius. Not 
only did the different schools- the Italian, French, Dutch, and 
German- differ from each other, but there was considerable 
variation in the views of the writers belonging to each school. 
However, they employed a common method in dealing with the 
problems of the conflict of laws, which is commonly called the 
" statutory " method.10 They all started from the same premise. 
From first to last they examined the different laws- city laws 
in Italy, provincial laws in France, or the laws of the particular 
states in Germany- to ascertain whether they concerned per-
sons, things, or acts. If it concerned persons, the enactment in 
question was known as a " personal " statute, governed by the 
law of the domicil. If it concerned things, it was known as a 
" real " statute, governed by the lex rei sitae. The term " mixed " 
statute was used by the different writers in various senses. Some-
times it had reference to acts and indicated that the lex loci con-
trolled. Other writers employed it when the statute was deemed 
to refer partly to persons and partly to things. Whatever prog-
ress was made in the conflict of laws between the thirteenth and 
nineteenth centuries on the continent was the result of the theo-
retical discussions mentioned. The courts contributed little, if 
any, to the development of the subject. The statutory theory was 
accepted in the legislation of the eighteenth century by the Maxi-
milian Code of Bavaria of 1756 11 and in part by the Prussian 
Code of 1794.12 
10 See I LAINE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45 et seq. u I, 2, § I7. 
12 Intr. §§ 22-42; I FORSTER AND Eccrus, PREUSSISCHES PRIVATRECHT (7th eel. 
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The insufficiency of the statutory method is seen clearly from 
the arbitrary and contradictory conclusions to which it led. For 
example, the incapacity of a married woman to contract without 
the authorization of her husband, the incapacity of a minor to sell 
property, or the incapacity of a house-son to make a will, which 
would seem to affect the person, was held by some writers to re-
late to things, governed by the law of the situs. Again, if the law 
of the situs governs things because of the control the local law 
has over the property, why was movable property excepted from 
such rule and placed under the law of the domicil? Or, if the 
lex loci governs acts for the reason that the parties are temporary 
subjects of the state, why are they not so subject for all purposes? 
Why apply the lex domicilii with respect to persons? Assuredly, 
a particular law may affect at the same time persons and things 
or persons and acts. Any attempt, therefore, to solve the prob-
lems of the conflict of laws on the basis of a classification of laws 
into those affecting persons, things, or acts is bound to fail. The 
voluminous discussions of the writers on the conflict of laws prior 
- to Story are evidence of this fact. Story has referred to them in 
the following words: "Their works", he says," abound with the-
oretical distinctions, which serve little other purpose than to pro-
voke idle discussions, and with metaphysical subtleties, which 
perplex, if they do not confound, the inquirer." 13 · 
Problems of the conflict of laws did not come before the English 
courts before the middle of the eighteenth century. Since that 
time they have presented themselves in ever increasing number, 
particularly in consequence of the enormous expansion in trade 
since the early part of the nineteenth century. Moreover, a con-
siderable number of disputes involving the conflict of laws came 
also before the courts of the United States. The result was that 
upwards of soo decisions by Anglo-American courts relating to 
this subject existed at the time Story wrote his Commentaries. 
Characteristic of Anglo-American law has been its development 
by the courts and not by legal writers. In dealing with questions 
of the conflict of laws, however, the English courts, prior to Story, 
I8g6) 53 et seq.; I DERNBURG, PREUSSISCHES PRIVATRECRT (5th ed. I894) 5I et seq.; 
I KoCJI, Al.roEMEINES LANDRECHT FUR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN (8th ed. I884) 
38-54· 
13 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Ist ed. I834) § II. 
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relied to a large extent upon the discussions of continental writers, 
notably upon those of the Dutch school, whose territorial point 
of view appealed to the English judges. Huber's brief and con~ 
cise commentary was most commonly cited. Very little had been 
done on the subject of the conflict of laws in England and America 
prior to Story. The most extensive English work on the subject 
was by Jabez Henry, who published in 1823 a work entitled The 
Judgment of the Court of Demerara in the Case of Odwin v. 
Forbes, to which was prefixed" A Treatise on the Difference Be~ 
tween Personal and Real Statutes", etc.14 In 1830 and 1831, 
Fortunatus Dwarris published A General Treatise on Statutes 
containing a few pages relating to personal, real, and mixed 
statutes and certain elementary rules of the conflict of laws.111 
In the United States Samuel Livermore had published, in 1828 
in New Orleans, a work entitled Dissertations on Questions Which 
Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States 
and Nations, consisting of 172 pages. Volume 2 of Kent's Com~ 
mentaries contained a discussion of foreign marriages, divorces, 
judgments, and assignments.16 None of these works, however, 
was a comprehensive exposition of Anglo-American law. 
Story's work consisted of 557 pages. It was divided into 17 
chapters entitled, respectively, Introductory Remarks (1-18), 
General Maxims of International Jurisprudence (19-38), Na~ 
tional Domicil (39-49), Capacity of Persons (5o-99), Marriage 
(Ioo-18), Marriage-Incidents to (119-67), Foreign Divorces 
(168-92), Foreign Contracts (193-307), Personal Property 
(308-57), Real Property (358-90), Wills and Testaments (391-
402), Succession and Distribution (403-10), Foreign Guardian-
ships and Administrations (4II-43), Jurisdiction and Remedies 
(444-90), Foreign Judgments (491-515), _Penal Laws and Of-
fenses ( 5 I 6-2 2), Evidence and Proofs (52 3-3 2). Leaving out 
of consideration for the present the general maxims discussed in 
Chapter II, we find in Story's chapter headings the classifications 
which have been followed substantially by all writers since. In-
stead of discussing the problem of the conflict of laws under the 
-three traditional points of view of " personal ", " real ", and 
14 Pp. I-86. 
15 Part II, at 647-51. 
16 2 KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERicAN LAW (1827) 78, 8g, IOI, 329. 
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" mixed "statutes, Story grouped them with respect to the subject 
matter to which they related. The subject of domicil, which is 
covered in I I pages, presents the general characteristics which it 
has today in the United States. This statement is subject, how-
ever, to one or two important qualifications. As regards the domi-
cil of married women, no exceptions were recognized in the time 
of Story to the general rule that a wife's domicil follows that of 
the husband.11 In the matter of domicil of choice, Story held that 
a domicil so acquired would be retained until the acquisition of 
a new domicil facto et animo, except where a person abandons a 
domicil of choice with an intention to resume his native domicil, 
in which event the latter is reacquired in itinere, while he is on his 
way.18 This modification of the general rule finds no support in 
the decisions of the courts of the United States today. 
Under the title Capacity of Persons, Story discusses the topics 
generally dealt with by the civilians under the heading of Status 
and Capacity. The discussion includes not only the power of 
minors, married women, prodigals, and lunatics to contract and 
to transfer property, and the " capacity " to marry, but also the 
subject of legitimacy and illegitimacy and legitimation by sub-
sequent marriage. Contrary to the civil law writers, Story holds 
that the American law looks to the lex loci as regards capacity 
to contract 19 and to marry/0 instead of to the law of the domicil. 
He justifies this rule on the grounds, (I) that the parties may be 
presumed to contract with reference to the law of the place where 
the contract was made and to be executed, and, ( 2) because of 
the certainty and simplicity in its application.21 In the matter of 
marriage, an exception would doubtless be recognized, according to 
Story, in the case of incest and polygamy.22 Story's views have 
become the established law in the United States.23 
17 See STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 49· 
18 I d. § 48. 
19 Id. § 76. 
2 0 I d. § 8g. 
21 Id. § 76. 
22 I d. § 8g. 
2 3 Some courts of the state of domicil have declined to recognize a foreign mar-
riage, valid by the law of the place of celebration, which was entered into in eva-
sion of the domiciliary law. See Beale, Laughlin, Guthrie, and Sandomire1 Marriage 
and the Domicil (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 501. 
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Differing from the continental writers, Story has no chapter 
devoted to the " formalities " of legal transactions. In continen-
tal literature the maxim locus regit actum denotes that the law of 
the place where the act is executed governs its formal requisites. 
Story uses it in a broader sense and applies it to the nature, obliga-
tion, and interpretation of contracts.24 The same rule governs 
the formal requisites of contracts, according to Story, even so far 
as they fall within the Statute of Frauds.25 The erroneous notion 
introduced later by Leroux v. Brown/6 that the Statute of Frauds 
is procedural, and thus governed by the lex fori, finds no support 
in Story's Commentaries. As regards dispositions of land, inter 
vivos and by will, the law of the situs was held by Story to govern 
the formal requisites,27 a doctrine early fixed in Anglo-American 
law. With respect to wills of personal property Story approved 
the general rule laid down by the courts that the law of domicil at 
the time of death controlled even in the matter of formal requi-
sites.28 The rigidity of the Anglo-American law led later to a 
modification of this rule by statute. · 
Story favors the view, upon principles of public policy, that 
marriage should be governed by the law of the place of celebration, 
even in cases of evasion, " with a view to prevent the disastrous 
consequences to the issues of such a marriage ".29 The incidents 
to marriage, especially the effect of marriage upon the property 
of the spouses, are stated by Story substantially as they would be 
today. As regards movables owned at the time of the marriage, 
he would apply the law of their matrimonial domicil, that is, the 
law of the state where they expected to make their home. Story 
says that the American decisions in support of the doctrine could 
be justified on the analogy to contracts by assuming a tacit matri-
monial contract, " if it can be so treated ", which would be gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance, or, if governed by 
the municipal law, without reference to any tacit contract, Story 
felt that the application of the law of the future domicil was 
"equally capable of a solid vindication ".so 
In connection with the subject of divorce Story points out the 
24 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 263. 
25 Id. § 262. 
26 12 c. B. 801 (1852). 
21 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 435, 475· 
2s I d. § 636. 
29 Id. § 123. 
so Id. § 199. 
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difficult problems arising on the continent and between England 
and Scotland because of the divergency in the local legislation. 
Less than four pages are devoted to the law of the United States.31 
Divorces, while not unknown in this country at the time, were not 
as easily obtained as they are today. The infrequency of foreign 
divorces is accounted for partly by the fact that married women 
at the time could not establish separate domicils. At the time of 
Story it was already the established law that the grounds for di-
vorce were governed by the lex fori, and that a divorce obtained 
in a state in which both spouses had acquired a bona fide domicil 
would be recognized, even by the courts of the state in which the 
parties had their domicil at the time of the alleged offense, al-
though there was no cause for divorce under the law of such state. 
The subject of contracts is developed at length by Story.32 He 
deals with contracts in general and also with special classes of con-
tracts, such as contracts relating to land, contracts for the purchase 
or sale of goods, and bills and notes. " Generally speaking," says 
Story, " the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of 
the place, where it is made." 33 " Where the contract is either 
expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other place, there the 
general rule is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the 
parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and 
interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the place of per-
formance. This would seem to be a result of natural justice; and 
the Roman law has (as we have seen) adopted it as a maxim." 34 · 
Story cites in support of the proposition Voet, Huber, and Boul-
lenois and states that it has the general consent of foreign jurists. 
He cites in support also the dictum of Lord Mansfield in Robinson 
v. Bland,S5 Kent's Commentaries, and seven American cases de-
31 STORY, op. cit. supra note r3, §§ 228-30. 33 Id. § 242. 
32 Id. §§ 231-373. 34 Id. § z8o. 
35 z Burr. 1077, ro78 (K. B. I76o). It has been charged that the law of the 
place of performance is inconsistent with the principles of the common law, being 
lln impm;tation from the civil law. Beale, Wltal Law Governs tlte Validity of a 
Contract (1909) 23 HARv. L. REv. r, 6 et seq. Such a charge can be supported, 
however, only if a preconceived view is taken of what constitutes the common law. 
Moreover, in the light of its long pedigree, both in England and the United States, 
it would seem to be as much entitled to recognition as a legitimate offspring of the 
common law as any other doctrine of fue conflict of laws, which may have been 
first adopted on the continent. 
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cided by the United States Supreme Court, by a federal circuit 
court, and by the courts of New York and Massachusetts.36 
Story's view regarding the law governing the validity of contracts 
where the place of performance and that of the place of making 
do not coincide has been followed by a large number of cases in 
the United States, but it has been rejected by the American Law 
Institute.37 
Movables at the time of Story were regarded everywhere as 
subject to the law of the owner's domicil. Mobilia sequuntur 
personam was an adage which expressed the rule in the conflict 
of laws since the early days when the question was discussed. " It 
has so general a sanction among all civilized nations", says Story, 
" that it may be treated as a part of the jus gentium." 38 Story ad-
mits, however, that the legislation of the place where the property 
is situated, having actual control over the res, has the power to 
dispose of it in accordance with its law, but queries how far courts 
of justice ought, upon their own authority, to interpose such a 
limitation, independently of legislation, " since the doctrine, which 
it unfolds, aims a direct blow at the soundness of the policy, on 
which the general rule, that personal property has no locality, is 
itself founded." 39 It was only in the second half of the nineteenth 
century that the importance of legal transactions relating to per-
sonal property produced a fundamental change in the point of 
view which led to the adoption of the rule that the law of the 
situs should control rights in movables as well as in immovables. 
That rights in immovables were subject to the law of the situs 
has been established in Anglo-American law in a much more abso-
lute sense than it ever was on the continent. Thus, it had become 
fixed law in the time of Story that it controlled in the matter of 
conveyancing, both the capacity of the parties, the formalities 
with which the deed must be executed, as well as the extent of the 
interest to be conveyed.40 Likewise, the effect of marriage upon 
immovables, owned by the spouses at the time of marriage or 
subsequently acquired, and any other interest claimed in im-
36 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 281, n.7. 
81 REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 332. 
ss STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 380. 
39 Id. § 390. 
40 Id. §§ 364, 428-3I, 445· 
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movable property by operation of law could be determined only 
with reference to the lex rei sitae.41 
In the law of wills and succession the same principle was recog-
nized, so that immovables would pass in case of intestacy to the 
heirs specified by the law of the situs. Wills disposing of im-
movable property had to conform to the law of the situs, both as 
to the capacity of the testator, the formaliti~s with which the will 
had to be executed, and the validity of the will in any other 
respect.42 Movable property, on the other hand, would be dis-
tributed in case of intestacy in accordance with the law of the 
decedent's domicil at the time of his death. This law controlled 
also the formalities of such wills and their validity in other 
respects.43 These characteristic features of the common law, 
settled already in the time of Story, have been modified since his 
day only, by statute, as regards the formal execution of wills, by 
liberalizing the rules relating thereto. On the continent, owing to 
the doctrine of universal succession, both movable and immovable 
property is frequently subject to the same law. 
In the settlement of decedents' estates, likewise, a wide distinc-
tion is made between movable and immovable property. H The 
views announced by Story in this regard, as well as his observa-
tions relating to foreign guardianships, have remained the basic 
principles of our law. 
In the chapter on Jurisdiction and Remedies, Story outlines the 
fundamental rules of jurisdiction which characterize Anglo-
American law and differ widely from the rules on the continent. 
Most important of these is the foundation of jurisdiction in per-
sonam upon mere personal service. Such jurisdiction is claimed 
not ·only as to citizens, but also as to foreigners who happen to be 
momentarily in the state, without reference to the place where the 
contract was made or to be performed, where the tort was com-
mitted or the like. With respect to jurisdiction over citizens domi-
ciled abroad, " the extent of jurisdiction, which may be lawfully 
exercised over them in personam, is not so clear by acknowledged 
principles." 45 So far as such exercise of jurisdiction comes before 
the courts of the state in which such citizens are domiciled, " the 
41 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 448. 
42 I d.§ 474· 
43 I d. §§ 465-68. 
44 Id. §§ 509 et seq. 
45 Id. § 540. 
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duty of recognising and enforcing such claim of sovereignty, is 
neither clear, nor generally admitted. The most, that can be said, 
is, that it may be admitted ex comitate gentium; but it may also 
be denied ex justitia gentium, wherever it is deemed injurious to 
the interests of foreign nations, or subversive of their policy or 
institutions." 46 
At the time Story wrote, the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution had not been adopted, and the carrying on of inter-
state business by corporations had not taken the developments of 
today. There was no special reason, therefore, for a discussion of 
the problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporations and the 
abuses of imported litigation. 
Regarding the Statute of Limitations, Story approves the view 
held by Huber, Paul Voet, and others, that it concerns the remedy 
and is thus subject to the lex fori. He takes issue with those 
foreign jurists who rega~d the Statute of Limitations as affecting 
the substantive rights of the parties, arguing, (I) that foreigners 
are not entitled to crowd the tribunals of any nation with suits of 
their own, and, ( 2) " as little right can they have to insist, that 
the times, provided by the laws of their country, shall supersede 
those of the nation, in which they have chosen to litigate their 
controversies." 47 Story suggests, however, a possible distinction 
where the Statute of Limitations of a particular country not only 
extinguishes the right of action, "but the claim or title itself, ipso 
facto ", and the parties are resident within the jurisdiction during 
the entire period. Under such circumstances title to personal 
property held adversely has been recognized, and Story intimates, 
though he does not state so expressly, that a similar doctrine might 
be justifiable in cases where a debt is extinguished by reason of the 
expiration of the Statute of Limitations.48 • 
Judgments of foreign countries at the time of Story were re-
garded both in England and the United States merely as prima 
facie evidence to sustain the action, and to be deemed right until 
the contrary is established.49 Since that date they have been 
deemed conclusive in England and in most of the states of this 
country in which the question has arisen. 
46 Ibid. Cf. REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 47(2), So. 
47 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 578. 
48 I d. § 582. 49 Id. § 603, 
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The subject of crimes in its international aspects is dealt with 
to a very limited extent.50 Under the chapter heading of Penal 
Laws and Offenses Story states that the common law " considers 
crimes as altogether local, and cognizable and punishable exclu-
sively in the country, where they are committed." 51 For the same 
reason a disability imposed for conviction of crime has no extra-
territorial effect. Regarding the extradition of criminals, Story 
agrees with the view that a sovereign is not bound to render up 
fugitive criminals from other countries. The enforcement of 
" penal " laws in disputes between private individuals is not al-
luded to. 
In the final chapter, entitled Evidence and Proofs, Story lays 
down the established doctrine of Anglo-American law that courts 
will not take judicial notice of the laws of a foreign country, but 
that they must be proved as facts. 52 He also deals with what he 
calls a" most embarrassing, and as yet (in a great measure) un-
settled class of questions " 53 relating to the mode of proving 
foreign contracts, instruments, and other acts. Story points out 
that the competency of witnesses is governed in the common law 
by the lex fori, but intimates that where the only witness to a con-
tract is incompetent, on account of interest, by the common law, 
but competent by the law of the place where the contract was made, 
his testimony might be admissible. 54 So far as the Statute of 
Frauds is involved or the requirement of a stamp, the instrument 
not being admissible in evidence unless it is properly stamped, 
Story holds that " in all these cases the proper proof would doubt-
less be given in conformity with the local law." 55 
If we compare this summary of Anglo-American law on the 
subject of the conflict of laws as it was one hundred years ago 
with the law of today, we find that it has changed only in minor 
respects. Its fundamental views and conceptions are the same. 
Story first formulated them, and where they were not firmly estab-
lished at the time, they became so, thanks to the great esteem in 
which his work was held. 
A second and considerably enlarged edition of Story's Com- . 
5o STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 619-28. 53 Ibid. 
RU§~ HU§~ 
52 ld. § 637. 
55 I d. §§ 262, 631. Cf. REs:rATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws (1934) §§ 598, 6o2. 
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mentaries appeared in r84r, and a third edition, containing the 
author's last revisions, was published in r846, after his death. 
By this time the size of the book had grown to ro68 pages. The 
fourth edition was published by E. H. Bennett, in r852; the fifth 
edition by the same editor, in r857; a sixth edition by Isaac F. 
Redfield, in r865; a seventh edition by E. H. Bennett, in r872; 
and an eighth edition by Melville M. Bigelow, in r883. 
Characteristic of Story's work is his detailed consideration of 
the views of continental writers, from which he quotes copiously. 
Story says that in the preparation of his Commentaries he has 
availed himself chiefly of the writings of Rodenburg, the Voets 
(father and son), Froland, Boullenois, Bouhier, and Huber "as 
embracing the most satisfactory illustrations of the leading doc-
trines ".56 Most references are to Boullenois, but great reliance 
is placed upon Huber, of whom he writes," Some attempts have 
been made, but without success, to undervalue the authority of 
Huberus. . . . It is not, however, a slight recommendation of his 
works, that hitherto he had possessed an undisputed preference on 
this subject over other continental jurists, as well in England as 
in America." 57 Of the German writers Story consulted only those 
who wrote in Latin; many references are to be found to Hert's 
De Collisione Legum. 
At the time of the_ir publication Story's Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws made a profound impression. Not only did they 
become the authoritative work upon the subject in the United 
States, but they were held in very high regard in England. Burge 
said of Story's Commentaries in 1838, "His Treatise on the con-
flict of laws . . . is cited by English judges with the high com-
mendation it so justly merits, . . . ." 58 Frederic Harrison said in 
1879 that " from the date of its appearance hardly a single case 
on this subject in America or in England, and perhaps few on the 
Continent, have ever been decided without some reference to this 
learned book." 59 Dicey, in 1912, emphasized Story's "powerful 
common sense and extensive legal learning", 60 saying also, "The 
56 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § II, n.2. 
57 I d. § 31· 
58 1 BuRGE, CoMMENTARIES ON CoLONIAL AND FoREIGN LAws (1838) xi. 
59 HAruusoN, loc. cit. supra note 2. 
eo (1912) 28 L. Q. REv. 341, 342. 
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great merits of Story must be acknowledged by every one who can 
recognize the strength and solidity of good legal thinking." 61 In 
France, Foelix became an enthusiastic follower. He says, in 1843, 
"This result, to which we have been led by our researches and 
meditations, we find confirmed and developed in the learned work 
of Story. . . . We have not hesitated to adopt this doctrine, and 
we have followed it throughout our work." 62 For half a century 
Foelix's treatise was the standard work on the conflict of laws in 
France and as such had a considerable influence upon the French 
decisions. In Germany, Professor Mittermaier reviewed, in 1835, 
Story's Commentaries at length in the Kritische Zeitschrift fur 
Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes,63 in which 
he gave high praise to the American author. He dwells upon 
Story's " rare practical sense ", 64 combined with a " strict scientific 
training ". 65 Half a century later Bar speaks of Story's " won-
drous power of comparison ",66 the" masterly fashion" 67 in which 
he sets forth the Anglo-American decisions, and the " great 
subtlety " with which he criticizes " the details of the grounds 
of judgment ".68 Savigny made constant use of Story's Commen-
taries, of which he says: "A remarkable picture of this imperfect 
but hopeful state of things is presented in the excellent work of 
STORY, which is also extremely useful, as a rich collection of ma-
terials for every inquirer." 69 
No work of importance had appeared in any country on the 
subject of the conflict of laws since the publication by Boullenois 
of his Dissertations sur Les Questions qui naissent de la contrari-
ete des loix et des coutumes (I 7 3 2) and his Traite de la Person-
nalite et de la Realite des loix, coutumes, ou statuts (I 766). All 
the writers preceding Story had followed the statutory method, 
seeking to arrive at the solution of the problems of the conflict 
61 Dicey, loc. cit. supra note 6o. 
62 I FoELIX, TRAm DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Pru:vE (4th ed. by Demangeat, 
.t866) iv. 
63 Volume 7 (1835) 228 et seq. 
64 Id. at 229. 
ss Ibid. 
66 BAR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gillespie's trans. 1892) 47• 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
119 SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Guthrie's trans. 1869) Preface I-2. 
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of laws by a classification of all laws into "personal ", " real ", 
and " mixed ", a method which bad proven barren of any definite 
results. Story likewise expresses some of the old ideas, but with 
him they constitute merely the veneer or " shell "/0 but not the 
groundwork of his treatise. The substance of the Commentaries 
was based upon the decisions of Anglo-American courts. This 
constituted a new method and a complete break with that of the 
statutory school, the fetters of which Story helped to destroy in 
Europe. 
At the time of their publication, in 1834, Story's Commentaries 
were without question the most remarkable and outstanding work 
on the conflict of laws which had appeared since the thirteenth cen-
tury in any country and in any language. One hundred years 
have elapsed since then, during which, owing to the large increase 
in international trade and intercourse, the subject of the conflict 
of laws has gained greatly in importance. In the interval a large 
number of treatises on the subject have been written in many 
countries by some of the greatest jurists. Learned societies have 
been formed to study the problems of the conflict of laws. Legal 
periodicals have been established exclusively for the same purpose. 
International conventions have sought to unify the rules with 
reference to some of the most important topics. The United 
States this very year has witnessed the completion of a vast under-
taking, the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws by the American 
Law Institute. During this century great changes have taken place 
also in the political or juridical conditions of the different coun-
tries. In France, Italy, and Germany, the law has been unified, 
so that before the World War the questions of the conflict of laws 
could arise in those countries only between such countries and 
foreign nations. As a result the interprovincial or interstate side 
of the conflict of laws largely disappeared. But, with the dis-
location of physical boundaries as a result of the war, interprovin-
cial law has for the time being gained renewed importance.71 In 
the United States the Federal Government has been forced since 
the time of Story to exercise powers formerly exercised by the 
states, notably in the field of interstate transportation, so as to 
prevent questions of the conflict of laws from arising in this field 
70 GuTZWILLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at III. 
n For example, in France, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia. 
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between the states of this country. The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution has played an 
ever increasing role in limiting the freedom and power of the state 
courts and legislatures. In the light of all these developments, 
what place may Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws be 
said to occupy today? 
So far as Anglo-American law is concerned, important works on 
the subject of the conflict of laws have since been written in Eng-
land by Westlake, Dicey, and Foote, which have taken Story's 
place as authoritative statements of the modern English law. In 
the United States no similar works have appeared. The only 
larger treatise on the subject is by Wharton, 72 which made no dis-
tinct contribution to the subject. A century after their original 
publication, Story's Commentaries continue to be freely cited by 
the courts of the United States. 
On the continent many eminent jurists have been attracted by 
the conflict of laws since the time of Story. The following are 
among the familiar names,73 in France, Foelix, Despagnet, Weiss, 
Laine, Audinet, Surville & Arthuys, Pillet, Vareilles-Sommieres, 
Bartin, Niboyet, Arminjon, Valery; in Belgium, Laurent, Rolin, 
Poullet; in Germany, Savigny, Bar, Niemeyer, Zitelmann, Kahn, 
Neumeyer, Frankenstein, Gutzwiller, Lewald, Melchior, Nuss-
baum, Wolff; in Holland, Asser, Jitta, Kosters; in Italy, Mancini, 
Fiore, Lomonaco, Catellani, Fusinato, Contuzzi, Diena, Anzilotti, 
Cavaglieri, Pacchioni, Ago; in Austria, Walker; in Switzerland, 
Meili, Roguin, Bracher. Some of these writers have set forth the 
law of the particular country to which they belonged. Most of 
them, however, wrote theoretical works dealing with the funda-
mental principles of the subject. Starting with a priori premises, 
for which the authors claimed universal validity, they erected 
thereon, largely by deductive processes, their " systems " of the 
conflict of laws. This is not the place to indicate differences in the 
points of view maintained by the authors nor even to attempt a 
classification of their doctrines.74 Of importance in this study is 
to ascertain how they compare with Story as regards their influ-
72 A monumental treatise by Professor Beale is to be published in the near 
future. 
78 The authors appear more or less in chronological order, according to the dates 
of their publications. 
74 See BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) 62-113. 
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ence upon the conflict of laws. Of the nineteenth century writers 
two names stand out in this respect above the rest, and these are 
Savigny and Mancini. 
Savigny, known everywhere as the great German Romanist and 
the leading figure of the modern historical school, published five 
years after the appearance of Story's Commentaries, the eighth 
volume of his great treatise on modern Roman law, dealing with 
the application of law from the standpoint of time and place.75 
Savigny looked for a scientific foundation of the rules of the con-
flict of laws, which would enable them to develop on a universal 
basis, unhampered by the restricting influences of any particular 
local system of law. This scientific basis Savigny found to rest 
in the modern world upon the interdependence of sovereign states. 
According to Savigny, the problem of the conflict of laws does not 
involve the question whether the statutes of a particular state or 
country affect persons, things, or acts (as was the view of the statu-
tory jurists), nor is it primarily a question of the limits of the 
power of a given legislator. In his estimation the question may 
be stated thus: " To ascertain for every legal relation . . . that 
law to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject." 76 
This, he said, may be regarded as " a friendly concession among 
sovereign states ", but " this suffrance must not be regarded as the 
result of mere generosity or arbitrary will, which would imply that 
it was also uncertain and temporary ", but as " the proper and 
progressive development of law ".77 The judge must apply the 
law of the state or country to which the legal situation before the 
court belongs, called by Savigny the " seat " of the obligation. 
Savigny's treatise met with a most enthusiastic reception, not 
only in Germany and on the continent in general, but likewise in 
England, where it has been referred to, until the appearance of 
the modern English works by Westlake, Dicey, and Foote, more 
often than any other work except that of Story. Savigny did not 
try to find a direct solution for the manifold problems in the con-
flict of laws, but he sought to find a method which would furnish 
a key to their solution. The method that he gave to the world was 
75 The full title of the work in English is PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-A 
TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RE-
SPECT OF PLACE AND TIME. 
76 SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note 6g, at 27. 77 Id. at 28. 
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hailed as the veritable beginning of the modern science of the con-
, flict of laws, and with it the work of the statutory writers lost on 
the continent all further influence. Story's Commentaries has 
created a new epoch in the history of the conflict of laws, but his 
work was a practical one, based on the experience of Anglo-
American courts. Conditions on the continent were different. 
The courts did not occupy there the prestige held by them in 
England, the result being that the continental law was developed 
by the jurists rather than by the courts. Story's mode of approach 
was, therefore, foreign to that in vogue on the continent. More-
over, the Anglo-American conflict of laws had grown up along 
. peculiar channels, influenced by feudalistic conceptions and in-
sular notions of the common law, which were antagonistic to those 
recognized in continental Europe. While the rich storehouse of 
·English and American decisions and the judicial appraisal thereof 
by a learned and practical-minded judge could not help being 
appreciated and was in the nature of things drawn upon, Savigny's 
theoretical work was more in harmony with their mode of think-
ing. Since its appearance and until the end of the nineteenth 
century, Savigny's treatise on the conflict of laws may be said to 
have dominated continental thinking on the subject. 
The third leading figure of the nineteenth century in the field 
of the conflict of laws is Mancini. This great Italian statesman 
occupies a position quite different from that of either Story or 
Savigny. He wrote neither a great practical work on the conflict 
of laws of Italy, nor did he launch into the world an epoch-making 
theoretical treatise. His fame goes back to a lecture delivered by 
him on January 22, 185I, at the University of Turin on the sub-
ject of " Nationality as the Basis of International Law ". 78 In 
this lecture Mancini propounded a new theory of law, to the effect 
that law is essentially personal instead of territorial. It is made 
for a people and not for a territory- for a people whose common 
consciousness of nationality is derived from the landscape of the 
country in which they were born, from race, speech, custom, his-
tory, law, and religion. Law is territorial only insofar as it is a 
matter of public order. In the system of Mancini the notion of 
public policy no longer intervenes by way of exception in the con-
78 DELLA NAZIONALITA COME FONDAMENTO DEL DIRITTO DELLI GENU. 
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flict of laws as a limitation upon the application of foreign law, 
as it still does with Savigny. It constitutes one of the two funda-
mental principles upon which the rules of the conflict of laws rest. 
If a given provision of a local law is one of public order, it is 
territorial and applicable to all within the territory, without ref-
erence to their nationaiity. If it does not fall within this cate-
gory, it is personal, and the lex patriae controls. The conclusion 
last stated was modified, however, by a third fundamental prin-
ciple, relating to the autonomy of the parties and the idea of lib-
erty, according to which the law chosen by the parties will control, 
so far as they are free to choose the law. 
The new doctrine announced by Mancini, so contrary to that 
of Story and Savigny, came at a time of national aspirations and 
for that reason found a welcome response, not only in Italy but 
elsewhere. The principle of nationality was adopted by the 
Italian Civil Code, of 1865, as the law governing capacity, status, 
and domestic relations, the rights of succession upon death, and 
to some extent the law governing contracts. In the legislation 
of other countries the lex patriae displaced the lex domicilii as 
regards capacity and status and in other respects. Mancini's 
views exerted also great influence upon the courts of continental 
Europe belonging to the Latin group, especially in the matter of 
"ordre public". Every legislation dealing with the conflict of 
laws in Europe since the time of Mancini has made nationality 
the basis of the personal law in its system of the conflict of laws. 
It is only in the most recent times that a certain reaction has set 
in among the continental writers against the views advocated by 
Mancini, it being recognized today that the law of domicil has a 
legitimate place alongside that of the lex patriae. 
In the twentieth century another person has arisen who de-
serves to be mentioned in connection with Story, Savigny, and 
Mancini, as one of the great figures in the field of the conflict of 
laws. This is Dr. Antonio Bustamante, of Havana, Cuba. A dis-
tinguished jurist, his title to recognition among the great person-
alities in the field of the conflict of laws rests upon his authorship 
of the Pan-American Code of Private International Law/9 which 
79 BUSTAMANTE, SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, 
HAvANA (1928) Final Act, 20 et seq.; see also BusTAMANTE, DERECB:O lN'rERNA-
CIONAL PRIVADO (3 vols. 1931). 
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was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana in 
1928, and which has been ratified by many of the Latin-American 
countries. 5° The scope of the conflict of laws, according to Busta-
mante, is a two-fold one. It should indicate what foreign laws 
should be recognized as operative within a given state or country, 
and in addition it should set out the limits within which, from an 
international point of view, the legislation of such state or country 
should be confined. Similarly to the classification suggested by 
Mancini's doctrine, Bustamante would divide all laws into three 
classes: (I) those applying to persons by reason of their domicil 
or nationality and following them even when they go to another 
country. These he calls personal, or of an internal public order. 
( 2) Those binding alike upon all persons residing within the ter-
ritory, whether or not they are nationals. These he calls terri-
torial, local, or of an international public order. (3) Those apply-
ing only to the expression, interpretation, or presumption of the 
will of the parties, or of one of them. These he calls voluntary 
or of a private order. The difficulty with this mode of approach 
is that it furnishes no solution whenever the countries with which 
the juridical situation is connected fail to classify their laws in the 
same manner.81 It also throws upon the judge of the forum 
the duty of classifying laws of a foreign country in accordance 
with the three-fold division above suggested, a task which he is 
scarcely able to undertake successfully. 
Story's general theory of the conflict of laws is presented in the 
first two chapters of his Commentaries. According to Story, the 
laws of a country operate proprio vigore only within the limits of 
their territory. Whatever extraterritorial power they have re-
sults from their voluntary recognition, on grounds of comity, by 
the other states or countries. In thus attributing territorial force 
to law, Story follows the general maxims formulated by Huber. 
Story says: " The laws of every state affect, and bind directly all 
80 No agreement could be reached at the Conference regarding whether the law 
of domicil or that of nationality should determine the personal law. The Con-
vention allows each ratifying state to choose between the two. 
81 For example, if tw~ foreigners enter into a legal transaction in Cuba and the 
local Cuban law applicable to the matter is regarded as personal, that is, as falling 
within the first class, no solution is furnished by the Pan-American Code if the 
national law of the parties should deem it territorial, that is, as falling within the 
second class. 
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property, whether real or personal, within its territory." a2 And 
" no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind prop-
erty out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, 
• • • ." as " Whatever force and obligation the laws of one coun-
try have in another, depends solely upon the laws, and municipal 
regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper juris-
prudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent." a4 
Most continental writers have been severely critical of Story's 
theory of " comity". As used by the Dutch writers the term 
" comity " had a political connotation, which appears to leave the 
application of foreign law to the discretion of the courts, instead 
of basing it upon a duty to do justice. Story stated, however, ex-
pressly, that it rested upon " a sort of moral necessity to do 
justice ".a5 Nevertheless, no amount of explanation will cause 
the theory of " comity" to be acceptable to continental jurists, 
because of the suggestion contained therein that the rules of the 
conflict of laws have their foundation, not in considerations of 
law and justice but of self-interest and courtesy to other states. 
Melli has said of comity that it had prepared a " juridical blind 
alley" a6 for our subject, and that it blocked the way to its future 
development. According to Gutzwiller, a system of the conflict 
of laws based upon " comity" is " based upon sand ".a7 Busta-
mante says that comity is based on such ideas as interest, cour-
tesy, and reciprocity, and that "the name of science cannot be 
given to them, nor even a practical and useful system be based 
thereon." as 
The objection that " comity " implies self-interest, convenience, 
and utility is in itself without force, for the positive rules of the 
conflict of laws of all foreign systems rest upon such considera-
a2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 13, § x8. 
as Id. § 20. 
a4 Id. § 23. 
85 I d. § 35· 
a6 Ein Specimen aus der holliindischen Schule des internationalen Privatrechts 
(Ulricus Huber I636-z694) (x8g8) 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR lNTERNATIONALES PRIVAT-
UND STRAFRECHT I8g, 190. 
aT [nternationalpri.vatrecht, I STAMMLER'S DAS GESAMTE DEUTSCHE REcHT 
(1931) I$3I. 
as I TRATADo DE DERECHO INn:RNACIONAL PRIVADO (1896) 456; see also I Bus-
TAMANTE, DERECHO lNTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (I93I) 22. 
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tions. For example, the choice between the law of domicil and 
that of nationality and the notions of " public poli~y" are clearly 
determined by them. Nor would, in the eyes of most continental 
jurists, the objection to the Anglo-American point of view be re-
moved by the mere elimination of the word " comity " from its 
juristic terminology. Following Savigny, they insist upon the 
necessity of some international foundation for the rules of the con-
flict of laws. They regard the rules of the conflict of laws as im-
posed by some superior or outside power -be it that of interna-
tional law, or of a common consciousness which is binding in the 
nature of things. Between this view and the Anglo-American law 
there is an irreconcilable gulf. Anglo-American law does not ad-
mit the concept of law entertained by the above writers, which 
has no reference to physical force. It insists, therefore, that in 
the present organization of the world the rules of the conflict of 
laws are not enforced by any outside or superior authority, but 
are voluntarily accepted by each sovereign state. The very fact 
of sovereignty precludes the notion that foreign law can have 
any force or validity within the state except with the permission 
of the territorial sovereign. 
Story's views on the subject of comity have been attacked in 
the United States, so far as they have reference to the laws of the 
different states of this country. The contention has been made 
that the courts of one state should be under a constitutional obli-
gation to recognize rights created by the law of a sister state, and 
that Story's notion of comity has prevented the adoption of this 
view by the Supreme Court of the United States.89 The allegation 
is that under the comity doctrine the courts of one state have de-
clined to give effect to causes of action that arose in a sister state. 
The Supreme Court has recognized in the past the power of the 
courts of the individual states to decline to enforce causes of ac-
tion of a sister state on grounds of public policy, but it is free at 
any time to reverse this position by invoking the due process 
clause or the full faith and credit clause of the F~deral Constitu-
tion. If a distinction is to be made between the power of courts 
to enforce causes of action that have arisen in a foreign country 
and those that have arisen in a sister state, it would seem that the 
sg Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE 
L. J. 656, 657-58. 
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proper way of attaining the end would be by invoking constitu-
tional provisions and not by an attack upon the comity theory in 
general. So far as the rules of the conflict of laws are concerned, 
apart from constitutional obligations, it is perfectly clear today 
that they are adopted by our courts in the same manner as are 
rules of domestic law. Since comity in the sense of courtesy to 
other nations is not a factor entering into the judicial process, it 
would be well if the use of the term were abandoned. 
Serious issue may be taken with Story's territorial theory of 
Anglo-American law. The assertion that " no state or nation can 
by its own laws directly affect or bind property out of its own 
territory, or bind persons not resident therein" is, to say the 
least, misleading.90 "Much of the confusion in Anglo-American 
legal thinking", says Professor Cook, "goes back to Story's trea-
tise." 91 A detailed criticism, however, of Story's views in this 
regard would be out of place in a commemorative article on the 
occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of his Commentaries. 
Many new schools of thought have arisen since the time of 
Story, and in the light of these changes no general statement 
made a century ago concerning the nature of sovereignty, law, 
or rights will bear the test of critical examination today. There 
are even now great differences of view regarding the most elemen-
tary and fundamental notions in the conflict of laws. Continental 
thought still differs radically from Anglo-American, and no agree-
ment exists among the writers of any country. Other criticisms 
of Story's treatise, to the effect that it avoids any statement of 
general principle,92 that it contains no attempt at historical de-
velopment of the subject,93 and that it is " one of the least scien-
tific ",94 because of its indiscriminate use of foreign authors, may 
be ignored likewise, in view of the general objective of this article. 
No doubt, the great vogue since the days of Savigny of a priori 
writings on the conflict of laws hid for a time on the continent the 
90 See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 
33 YALE L. J. 736, 737; Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict 
of Laws (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 368. 
91 The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 
457.483. 
92 BAR, op. cit. supra note 66, at 46. 
93 Id. at 47· 
94 HARRisoN, loc. cit. supra note 2. 
HeinOnline  -- 48 Harv. L. Rev.  38 1934-1935
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
true merits of Story's Commentaries. In recent years, however, 
a change has come about in continental thinking, for the exclusive 
use of the theoretical method has been found insufficient and a 
more realistic approach in the study of the conflict of laws found 
to be-indispensable. As a result, Story is honored once more as 
the first and foremost representative of the practical method. One 
of the leading German writers, speaking of Story's influence upon 
the development of the conflict of laws, says that through his in-
fluence upon Foelix, Savigny, and Bar he has given Europe "a 
sound and equitable conception of the conflict of laws ". 95 This 
is the highest praise that could be bestowed upon any author. In 
the United States and England, Story is revered today as the 
father of the conflict of laws. In this one hundredth anniversary 
year of the publication of his Commentaries, the rest of the world 
joins the Anglo-American in rendering homage to the great Ameri-
can jurist, and to acclaim him one of the leading personalities of 
all time in the field of the conflict of laws. 
Ernest G. Lorenzen. 
YALE SCHOOL OF LAW. 
gs Gutzwiller, 29 RECUEIL DES COURS, AcAD. DE DR. INT. (1929) 341, 351. 
